

Research Article

Wifi Pentesting Roadmap for Classic-Future Attacks and Defenses

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Abstract

The most advanced attack on the Wireless Fidelity (WIFI) network uses social engineering. The hacker makes portal captive and forces the victim for disconnecting to internet instead of entering the real password of the WIFI. In normal actions, asking WIFI password on the web interface is not the real process, but sometimes the victim is not experience enough on security and thinks that it is a technical problem. Also, the victim didn't have internet connection due to the hard deauthentication and the select open access, which is not his WIFI network. The future generation of WIFI could be use a secure deauthentication. So, this article proposed how the actual attack will be processed, how is the secure deauthentication and how hacker could use this same attack with more secure network. Like conclusion, solutions to resolve this problem will be proposed. New hacking arsenal for replacing the deauthentication is the smart-jamming. With the secure deauthentication, reforging the packet for telling the victim to deauthenticate to the network will not be possible anymore. The smart-jamming select the frequency of the access point of the victim and jam only this specific frequency by sending a noise. In this scenario, the same effect of the first attack is still possible. For the best security of network, two solutions will be proposed: secure deauthentication and hopping frequency. A defensive proposition about secure deauthentication will be found in this article by using cryptographic key exchange like Diffie Hellman (DH), Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman (ECDH) and Super Isogenies Diffie Hellman (CSIDH).

Keywords

CSIDH, Deauthentication, ECDH, Smart-Jamming, Wifi

1. Introduction

The classic attack on WIFI network is the Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) cracking password [1-7] and Personal Identification Number (PIN) cracking using Wi-Fi Protected Setup (WPS). The two options are not used in most case on the WIFI network. The security uses actually Wireless Application Protocol (WAP) privacy. The pentesting on WAP consists of the word list password attack. The hacker captures the four-way handshake and use offline cracking to test

all possibilities of password on this word list. If the password of the victim is secure enough and the victim changes his password regularly, this attack is not interesting. Actually, the advanced Denied of service over WIFI attack is possible by reforging a packet for telling the victim to deauthenticate to the network. The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) norm doesn't specify a secure deauthenticate and doesn't verify if it's the real network or a fake network

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which sent this reforge packet, and it tells the victim for disconnecting to the WIFI network. Actually, the modern attack uses the two scenarios: the first step is to capture the four-way handshake to verify if password that the victim entered is the real one and use deauthenticate and fake open access point having a similar name for phishing the victim. Indeed, the hard deauthenticate will be repeated to the victim on the real network for having a denied of service.

If the victim selects the fake access point, a web interface asks the victim to enter the password and the four-way handshake permit to verify if the password captured is correct or not. After that, the connection to internet of the victim will be established by stopping the denied of service and the hacker captures this WIFI password.

2. Methodology and Scenario Attack

2.1. Hardware Setup

In these experiments, phone is used as access point (Android Phone access point) and one victim which is connected to this real access point. A physical machine contains Windows 10 as a victim and the hacker machine on virtual machine VMWARE with Kali 2022. The physical machine and hacker machine have a specification on the [Table 1](#).

Table 1. Computers specifications.

Processor	Intel (R) core (TM) i5-10300H CPU @ 2.50Ghz
RAM	32Go
Operating System	Windows 10
Virtual Machine VM Ware	Workstation Pro 16.2.3 build-19376536
RAM of hacker virtual devices	4Go
Processor of hacker virtual devices	4Cores (2 Processors + 2 Threads)
Hard Drive of hacker virtual devices	120Go

For the classic scenario of deauthentication, two WIFI networks cards which could make injection packet mode attack will be used.

Table 2. Network card specifications.

WIFI Card	RT5572
WIFI band	2.4Ghz – 5Ghz – 5.8Ghz
Injection mode	Yes
Antenna	6dbi
Multiple Input Multiple Output (MIMO)	2T2R

For the future scenario, Software Defined Radio (SDR) also used as a programmable radio frequency hacking. The victim and hacker are not anymore on Windows, but on a real operating system using DragonOS R26 public. The DragonOn has a preinstalled Gnuradio 3.8 with the script of the smart jamming attack.

2.2. Classic Attack

This classic attack will be demonstrated on the studies of

Michael et al. (2020) and Arockiam (2010) [8, 9]. This attack will divide on two steps:

1. Capturing the four-way handshake
2. Capturing the password by using the evil twin

2.2.1. Capturing the Four-way Handshake

WPA/WPA2 uses a pre-shared key named Pairwise Master Key (PMK). The four way-handshake permits having a mutual authentication generated with PMK and create for each

session a Pairwise Transient key (PTK). The exchange between the supplicant (client) and Authenticator (Access Points) has four messages named message 1,2,3,4 on the Figure 1. Using a hashing function named Key Derivation Function (KDF), the equation (1) permits us to have the PMK.

$$\text{PMK} = \text{KDF}(\text{Passphrase}, \text{SSID}, \text{SSIDLen}, \text{RepetitionKDF}, \text{Keylength}) \quad (1)$$

Passphrase: Password between 8 until 63 characters

SSID: Service Set Identifier (SSID) of the authenticator

SSIDLen: Length of the SSID

RepetitionKDF: Number of the iteration of the hash function

Keylength: the length of the output of the hash function (in our case 256bits)

The PTK could be evaluated using the equation (2):

$$\text{PTK} = \text{KDF}(\text{PMK}, \text{Authenticator Nonce or ANonce}, \text{Supplicant Nounce or SNonce}, \text{Authenticator Media Access Control (MAC)}, \text{Supplicant MAC}) \quad (2)$$




Figure 1. Four-way handshake.



Figure 2. Presentation of Fluxion's requirement.

For capturing the four-way handshake and realizing all classic attack, the Kali 2022 will be install by using software like Fluxion illustrated in the [Figure 2](#).

For the first steps of the attack, the handshake will be captured for verifying if the password captured by the victim is true or not by the captive portal. For this, the second option handshake snooper should be selected like on the [Figure 3](#).




Figure 3. Presentation of Fluxion's attacks.

After the scanning, the access point should have a victim connected to this. For the previous selection, it's possible to scan all band or one specific band for having a good result for any specific channel, like on the [Figure 4](#).



Figure 4. Scanning of network.

For having the four-way handshake, the victim should be deauthenticated on the WIFI network. In this scenario, air-play tool permits the deauthentication. It is possible to use cowpatty verification. If the handshake is not obtained for the first 30 second, it will be resent until it is being obtained. With low budget, hacker should use synchronous options instead, it's possible to use asynchronous budget. If the hacker obtained the handshake, the attack should be success on the [Figure 5](#):



Figure 5. Success captured handshake.

2.2.2. Capturing the Password by Using the Evil Twin

This step will be divided in four steps like on this Figure 6:




Figure 6. Classic attack flow.

Step 1: For this classic attack hacker, the victim connects to the legitimate access point. The hacker uses two RT5572

WIFI cards: one for deauthentication and on another for the fake access point.

Step 2: The hacker sends deauthentication, to the legitimate as a victim user and accepts this deauthentication. The victim doesn't have internet connection and will search WIFI network. With more attempt, due to the deauthentication, the victim could never have an internet connection and think that it's a problem on the network and select the another one (which is open and without internet connection).

Step 3: The victim associate to the fake access point and send a web page request. The fake access point with web responds with portal captive and ask the victim to enter the login and password for restoring internet connect (the victim shouldn't do it).

Due to the captured four-way handshake, it is possible to verify if the password entered by the victim is correct or not.

Step 4: the victim stops the deauthentication and re-establishes his internet connection.

2.3. Future Attack

On the future plan, the norm of WIFI should mitigate on the secure deauthentication. Like on authentication, a similar process as the four-way handshake should be done. In this, the legitimate user doesn't deauthenticate to the legitimate access point if only, if the hacker has a password of the legitimate access point. Even, the hacker send denied of the service, the legitimate user doesn't accept it because hacker doesn't have the password [10-14].

Also, the hacker couldn't have also the four-way handshake and couldn't verify if the password entered is correct or not.

The Denied of service is also possible. Some Mikrotik WIFI enterprise client still has this option to protect to deauthentication. To enable this on Mikrotik client, the legitimate user should activate "Management Protection" like on the Figure 7.




Figure 7. Deauthentication protection on Mikrotik.

Table 3. WIFI channel specification.

Channel	Frequency (GHz)
1	2.412
2	2.417
3	2.422
4	2.427
5	2.432
6	2.437
7	2.442
8	2.447
9	2.452
10	2.457
11	2.462
12	2.484

The WIFI needs radio frequency for transmitting information, and it is still possible to jam by sending random message on this frequency. In this, the hacker should transform the channel to the specific frequency like on this Table 3:

This table show only the frequency on 2.4 GHz, but a specific Table is possible for the 5GHz and the WIFI 6.




Figure 8. Future attack flow.

Step 1: For this future attack by hacker, the victim connects to the legitimate access point. The hacker uses one Hackrf for deauthentication and one RT5572 for the fake access point.

Step 2: The denied of service is realized with the HackRF. Using Gnuradio flow graph like the Figure 9, it is possible to jam the channel with bandwidth chosen. The denied of service here is more aggressive because, it jams all channel and could jam also another SSID than the victim.




Figure 9. Schema bloc of jamming by Gnuradio.

Step 3: As same as the classic attack, the difference is that it's not possible anymore to make verification of the victim password

Step 4: As same as the classic attack, the victim restored his connection to internet by stopping the denied of service attack by the jamming using SDR.

As the classic attack, it is possible to capture the password without verification but the deauthentication will be replaced by the jamming using software defined radio.

2.4. Classic Defense

The classic defense actually uses Wi-Fi Protected Access version 3 (WPA3) uses cryptographic key exchange as Elliptic Curve Diffie–Hellman (ECDH) on the four-way handshake.

Diffie-Hellman Protocol

The Key exchange research begins by the fundamentals of discrete logarithm problem found by Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman name Diffie-Hellman (DH) in 1976. This protocol is based on the Figure 10.




Figure 10. DH protocol.

In this figure, the yellow arrow is the computation done by Alice.

The purple arrow is the computation done by Bob.




Figure 11. DH key exchange.

Before beginning the key exchange as like as on Figure 11, the two parts Alice and Bob start with a public parameter as the number prime p and the root primitive g which is very big. The secret part of Alice and Bob will be the number a and b ; and the public part of Alice and Bob will be $g^a \pmod{p}$ and $g^b \pmod{p}$.

The shared key of Alice will be calculated by the private key of Alice and public key of Bob: $K = [g^b \pmod{p}]^a \pmod{p}$

The shared key of Bob will be calculated by the private key of Bob and public key of Alice: $K = [g^a \pmod{p}]^b \pmod{p}$

This protocol could be explained by the Schreier Graph. This graph is often used in the context of the Schreier-Sims algorithm to find a Schreier basis for a given group.




Figure 12. Example of Schreier Graph for $p = 13$.

The schreier Graph non oriented at $\langle g \rangle \{1\}$ where $g^{13} = 1$, act in $(\mathbb{Z}/\mathbb{Z}13)^*$ generated by $S = \{2, 3, 5\}$

If Alice takes for example $a = 2$ as secret key, her public key is g^2 and Bob takes for example $b = 5$ as secret key and his public key is g^5 with $p = 13$.




Figure 13. Computation in Schreier Graph for $a = 2$; $b = 5$ and $p = 13$.

There are two types of keys used during: secret key encryption and public key. After the key exchange, Alice and Bob compute the same shared key like as Figure 13.

Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH)

The Protocol Diffie-Hellman will be performed using Elliptic curve defined by:

$$y^2 = x^3 + ax + b \quad (3)$$

Elliptic curve calculations, especially in the context of elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), include several essential operations.

Here are some calculation operations performed on elliptic curves: addition, multiplication by scalar, neutral element and morphism

The addition of two points P and Q on an elliptic curve produces a third point R . The addition of points is the fundamental operation which makes it possible to construct an Abelian group on the elliptic curve. The law of composition determines how to do this, and it can vary depending on the specific representation of the curve.

The arithmetic concerning the addition of two distinct points $P: (x_1; y_1)$ and $Q: (x_2; y_2)$ on this elliptic curve is defined as follows [15-19]:

The slope of the secant line passing through the two points is calculated by: $\lambda = \frac{y_2 - y_1}{x_2 - x_1}$

The coordinates of the point $R = P + Q$ are calculated using the equation (4):

$$x_R = \lambda^2 - (x_1 + x_2) \text{ and } y_R = \lambda(x_1 - x_R) - y_P \quad (4)$$




Figure 14. Addition on Elliptic Curve $P + Q = R$.

Graphically: Here are the steps to add two points P and Q :
Find the line passing through the two points P and Q
Find the point R , different from P and Q , intersecting the curve E

The result of the sum is the symmetric of R with respect to the abscissa axis.

Firstly, this law allows all the elements of the group to be added together, and to fall back on an element of the body, it is therefore a law of internal composition. Then, the curve is symmetrical with respect to the abscissa axis. The third step therefore necessarily brings us back to a point on the curve.

The doubling operation is a special operation which consists of adding a point to itself. For example, $2P$ is the result of the doubling operation of P . The doubling operation is

commonly used to speed up point addition calculations.




Figure 15. Doubling point $2P$.

The slope of the secant line passing through the two points is calculated as follows: $\lambda = \frac{3-y_1}{x_2-x_1}$

The coordinates of the point $R = 2P$ are obtained by the equation (5):

$$x_R = \lambda^2 - 2x_P \text{ and } y_R = \lambda(x_P - x_R) - y_P \quad (5)$$

Graphically to add the sum of two identical points, $P=Q$ is obtained by take the tangent of the curve on this point, and by carrying out the same addition operations. That is to say, the point R is the intersection between the curve and the tangent, such that different of R . The result is the symmetry of R with respect to the abscissa axis.

Scalar multiplication consists of multiplying a point P by an integer k to obtain a new point $Q = kP$. This operation is commonly used in ECC to generate public and private keys, as well as to encrypt and decrypt data. The result of scalar multiplication is usually another point on the elliptic curve, and this point is used in applications such as key generation in elliptic curve cryptography. The number of iterations depends on the value of the integer you use for multiplication. The larger this integer, the further the final result will be from the starting point along the curve.

A neutral element must be defined in order to be able to deal with a group, it is the neutral element of this group, according to the group law. This element, in the case of elliptic curves, is named ∞ . This point can be found graphically as the sum of a point on the curve and its symmetry with respect to the abscissa axis. Clearly, this is one of the two cases where the curve passing through two points of the curve does not intersect it at a third point.

This neutral element is therefore the point that this curve crosses at infinity, whether on the positive or negative side. The two elements are noted by $+\infty$ and $-\infty$ are considered as one and the same point. Another method makes it possible to obtain the neutral element as a result of the group law between two points, by adding the same point twice, if it is on the abscissa axis.

Morphism between two elliptic curves E_1 and E_2 is an application defined by the equation (6):

$$\varphi: E_1 \rightarrow E_2 \text{ and } \varphi(P + Q) = \varphi(P) + \varphi(Q) \text{ where: } \varphi(P + Q) \text{ is in } E_1 \text{ and } \varphi(P) + \varphi(Q) \text{ is in } E_2 \quad (6)$$

The exchange key will be like on the Figure 16 and Figure 17. Let an elliptic curve E over \mathbb{F}_p where p is a prime and $P \in E$ like a public parameter. As like on DH, ECDH uses secret key and public key to calculate shared key.




Figure 16. Group commutative ECDH.

The yellow arrow is the computation done by Alice.
The purple arrow is the computation done by Bob.



Figure 17. Exchange key ECDH.

The security of this key exchange protocol relies on the difficulty of two computational problems. The elliptic discrete logarithm problem requires finding the integer a when P and $[a]P$ are given. The Diffie-Hellman computational problem requires finding $[ab]P$ when $P, [a]P$ and $[b]P$ are given.

The example of Schreier Graph of ECDH is illustrated on Figure 18.




Figure 18. Example of Schreier Graph of ECDH with $a = 3$; $b = 5$ and $p = 13$.

On this Schreier Graph, $\mathbb{F}_p = 13$ and $S = \{2, 3, 5\}$

Let choose the secret key of Alice is $a = 3$ and his public key is $[3]P$ and for Bob the secret key is $b = 5$ and the public key is $[5]P$. After computation of shared key, Alice and Bob will be in the same point $[2]P$

2.4. Post quantum defense

Commutative Super Isogenies Diffie Hellmann (CSIDH) is an isogeny-based Diffie-Hellman protocol using supersingular curves defined on \mathbb{F}_p and commutative group action, which is quantum resistant key exchange. Isogenies are a morphism of elliptic curve.




Figure 19. CSIDH key exchange.

First, Alice and Bob take a secret subgroup a and b of the Elliptic curve E

Second, Alice calculates groups act as multiple isogenies $*a: E \rightarrow E_A$ and Bob calculates group act $*b: E \rightarrow E_B$

Afterward, Alice and Bob exchange the two public keys E_A and E_B

After receiving the two keys, Alice calculates E_{BA} while Bob calculates E_{AB}

Let gives example of Schreier Graph CSIDH illustrate on Figure 20.

In the Figure 21, E_A is a supersingular elliptic curve defined by: $y^2 = x^3 + Ax^2 + x$ over \mathbb{F}_{419}

The edges denote $\{3, 5, 7\}$ -isogenies, and given (clock-wise) by the action of $h_3, h_5, h_7 \in H$.




Figure 20. Schreier Graph for CSIDH.

The good mixing properties of the underlying isogeny graph are relevant for the security of isogeny-based cryptosystems. The graph above which serves as an example is a Schreier graph associated with our class-group action and the chosen generators. One view on this is that one can move

quickly between two elliptic curves by using isogenies properties in the subgraph corresponding to one generator by switching to the subgraph corresponding to another generator. This thus replaces the square-and-multiply algorithm in cryptosystems based on exponentiation.




Figure 21. Example of Group action with CSIDH.

Where:

- — — : first calculation by Alice and Bob
- - - : public key exchange between Alice and Bob
- - - - - - - - - : second calculation after exchange of public keys

$$E_A = [+,-,+,-] = (h_5^{-1} * h_3 * h_7^{-1} * h_3) * E_0$$

$$E_B = [+,+,-,+] = (h_5 * h_3^{-1} * h_7 * h_5) * E_0$$

$$E_{AB} = E_{BA} = (h_5^{-1} * h_3 * h_7^{-1} * h_3 * h_5 * h_3^{-1} * h_7 * h_5) * E_0 = E_{390}$$

The parameters of the example above are chosen, an elliptic curve E_0 on a finite body \mathbb{F}_{419} .

The participants in the key exchange are called Alice and Bob. They each choose an integer which are respectively $a = [+,-,+,-]$ and $b = [+,+,-,+]$ and which are used as private keys. Alice calculates and publishes $E_A = a * E_0$

as the public key. Bob proceeds in the same way and calculates his public key $E_B = b * E_0$. After public key exchange, due to the commutativity of the action of elliptic curve groups, both parties can now calculate $E_{AB} = E_{BA} = a * E_B = b * E_A$, which is then used as a shared secret.

3. Results and Discussions

3.1. Classic Attack

After launching the attack, the victim couldn't access to internet connection due to the deauthentication and the new fake access point with the same name will be created. [20-22] The Figure 22 shows the result of this.



Figure 22. Fake access point.

If the victim connects to the fake access point due to aggressive denied of service on the real network, the web portal captive will be appearing for asking users to restore the internet connection like on [Figure 23](#).




Figure 23. Deauthentication protection on Mikrotik.

Due to the handshake captured, the web could verify if the password entered by the victim is corrected or not. The two web interfaces [Figure 24](#) and [Figure 25](#) show this. When the user enters a real password, the fake access point will be stopped and the victim will connect to the real network directly.




Figure 24. Password error entered.




Figure 25. Password success entered.

The final step is to see the password obtained by the victim will be restored on the path attacks/captive portals/name_wifi like on this [Figure 26](#).




Figure 26. Log captured password.

3.2. Future Attack

As a classic attack, the future attack uses the same process but replaces the deauthentication by the jamming [23-24]. This section presents the results of the jamming. By using the jamming with SDR and HackRF like devices, the victim doesn't have connection Internet anymore, like on the [Figure 27](#).

After stopping the attack, the victim reestablished internet connection.



Figure 27. Jamming effect with SDR.

3.3. Classic Comparing to Future Attack

Table 4. Comparisons between classic and future attack over WIFI.

	Classic attack	Future attack
Feasibility	Simple deauthentication	Secure deauthentication
Dos Effect	Selective jamming (only target) No disruption with other SSID	Jamming all targets Disruption with other SSID having the same channel
Cost	Cheap	Expensive
Complexity	Simple	Complex
Verification of password captured on phishing	Yes	No

The Table 4 shows the difference between classic attack and future attack. The simple deauthentication is not possible for the secure deauthentication by using jamming. So, this future attack is more disrupt and not possible to make a selective denied of service. The classic attack is more simple and cheaper, it's possible to make the attack in a simple device like ESP8266 or ESP32XX, but the future attack needs Software Defined Radio which is more expensive.

3.4. Classic and Future Defense

The Table 5, 6 and 7 show the different key exchange which is possible to use over WIFI. The demonstration and installation is provided in the link at the references [25-26].

Table 5. DH key exchange.

Alice private key: alice.priv

```
0xb0572e96131d2b3bccaca9ee5e95feb1d497acfc78968416c0ea5a4c695a17a43bab5b6596cd4789442b371f0c4090131f0f40fce3f01328c60c
33b05ddfb156a286c971cc6884ffee01da30181a865dbc73526ff2c18911812dc641f7e68098b6f528b5d1d4f6ccd4608ebe074a5608739d627dac
d1e04dbede6d652f119fdb801e389b6f36f6a238c851ca62214f1bda350f6eb7c2f7e58f40d288099e543cb548d1a15d81df70ea0ca8c48a72643c
23db4df6d72171449c69e4dcfbdd03196787814e5802d36be9402b71f7c84299f36eaa2940f71113c7f3eb34eab3fa7b181ca03c318f47982b82e
8980c82d983f8f5bf6377de7a1f6b6c64fa71a54d
```

Alice public key: alice.pub

```
0xb98325655307e9d2a48494a434ba62ce8c3a58d5902bc7c238dc3b1ff93f3ff1542fa833f3944f86fe477fec8a29201afbe6f5270d0fe2de4b2247
85aa2506e05f01b1158dad4094e4100958289ba56a86f7c82b8488e6aff913ba574f82a45592d1638060d97b19767725a6adbb78e7f5c1acbd28
991483ceef1719bc7dac0a7bbf1e1218f7cfc326f72cfda58be3caf556f4f458bf5c78e1ba127a24a004b6ef8cce759d46a3c3d5f4b9d5d241b97514
513e33b500ab7f24bbacf3a6974a008567ffaef7da5428b6d465820b15f59f0878dac65d826129007a5790c5d18a0cc305f25f530998075f4fc7926
09ede1d3d7cfd0638036690c750e0cc498764
```

Bob private key: bob.priv

```
0x43928225562c57ffa837ea0764eedd3545bf8fe08700889e116e27a3e566b5ccde35b09ae9dafa38946507c4241b392fcb3699fb37aab1dd91d3
8cc9254f8d83cc5ced06a02e7eb99e910d01bb6a0a5c1f023b7b1051e73a20c6a18d39feff2655c4847fc10cab250365ff2c53d207fb7b819f12623
884997aa30d0ac05ea4ff98464c102c10fa9f6472ed85ca1d3fef1523e2ed3bd226b1db8f79af88f406371564651d338674f31ffc5a65a878bfb3ce6
e4d4cf5223c86f17ab1c3c69e1535db7298f86e7db934ca00bcc1a5f17d5f3604bb984914fc705e603b63b81ab1b5fdb64b1fb192b964972b45fab
34e01605d616c401a115666d0cdf6a688eaf1ad
```

Bob public key: bob.pub

```
0x56eb84dd55efd976520d6e59ffe870495def898432005033af759e078491faa750a1688fe091fdd2aa0aa04fb5524e068b8a163a0f77696d77b0
bf45889d974e390eef5fc78228f95f839d2aa42273fd4d9448b90bb568e402e90b89f906bab353ad25258a34b512d7532d827a88c5962542325fa
f27e24b7c30b56e8453f19ed576539ea2b5c9bc1abb58c3720ebe04b8b439a7ce4663ca9971780530504751551057fc5305fb1cd2a8335e17017d
978ddae7048c96633520d8f13833cc0537d6ff510f27a465bb83b89a0173fda81a39c69e1e491c5ea9199802bb951c11725071e994d8f5dd3ec74
4e05cc2ecfa29b2addeb5f3cf219a44e6eefd74a7ec4b
```

Shared key: key1.key and key2.key

```
0xd0aa14e6a41177850b170ab13413c46aae620426fb80399c944480113dc99fef3ae28134c410b159ab4080b77aeb0cab4d9116377c91e21a367
87775958fd06d3e83f3afcf1d9ac27c05dba5eaa70a883fe73fbe4218edb3b1ff5a5da1ff4506e17949220c8352f6c54238fe311c086137867462de9
30520c4851d41892ad46e14c9744f3c4e6c2cbb8725931b22179d763e64de22dbfcce39ffa5a4ad52a030b4f21ff88af4e7054dfbf84fb7c86a1640
0567d6ff6f136c31fb4ab4bbd03bb6b25a3c6b4e14b31c78a80dd1a2f740da43e5eb7f69b08c95439e673abac3dd7bb0f21e9bce8e4de9eb17482b
22829fc1f499a848f9272a6ebba3247096b80baf
```

After Alice generates private key then public key named alice.priv then alice.pub by using command `keygen_dh.py -n alice;` and does the same operation for Bob to have bob.priv then bob.pub. The Table 5 resumes all key generated by the algorithm DH. By using the command `sharedkey_dh.py`, the Figure 28 shows that shared key is equals for alice and bob part.

```
root@ubuntu:/home/cryptoandwifi/SRC# python3 shared_dh.py -p alice.pub -s bob.p
riv -k key1.key
shared key
0xd0aa14e6a41177850b170ab13413c46aae620426fb80399c944480113dc99fef3ae28134c410b
159ab4080b77aeb0cab4d9116377c91e21a3678775958fd06d3e83f3afcf1d9ac27c05dba5eaa7
0a883fe73fbe4218edb3b1ff5a5da1ff4506e17949220c8352f6c54238fe311c086137867462de9
30520c4851d41892ad46e14c9744f3c4e6c2cbb8725931b22179d763e64de22dbfcce39ffa5a4ad
52a030b4f21ff88af4e7054dfbf84fb7c86a16400567d6ff6f136c31fb4ab4bbd03bb6b25a3c6b4
e14b31c78a80dd1a2f740da43e5eb7f69b08c95439e673abac3dd7bb0f21e9bce8e4de9eb17482b
22829fc1f499a848f9272a6ebba3247096b80baf
root@ubuntu:/home/cryptoandwifi/SRC# python3 shared_dh.py -p bob.pub -s alice.p
riv -k key2.key
shared key
0xd0aa14e6a41177850b170ab13413c46aae620426fb80399c944480113dc99fef3ae28134c410b
159ab4080b77aeb0cab4d9116377c91e21a3678775958fd06d3e83f3afcf1d9ac27c05dba5eaa7
0a883fe73fbe4218edb3b1ff5a5da1ff4506e17949220c8352f6c54238fe311c086137867462de9
30520c4851d41892ad46e14c9744f3c4e6c2cbb8725931b22179d763e64de22dbfcce39ffa5a4ad
52a030b4f21ff88af4e7054dfbf84fb7c86a16400567d6ff6f136c31fb4ab4bbd03bb6b25a3c6b4
e14b31c78a80dd1a2f740da43e5eb7f69b08c95439e673abac3dd7bb0f21e9bce8e4de9eb17482b
22829fc1f499a848f9272a6ebba3247096b80baf
root@ubuntu:/home/cryptoandwifi/SRC#
```

Figure 28. Evaluating shared key using DH.

Table 6. ECDH key exchange.

Alice private key: alice.priv

```
0x12de0040d1efa8e14a088fa09e864fd9f4f51aa8a3ca7f87a0028e5043f6d966
```

Alice public key: alice.pub

```
0x3d5703e7d124f265c109181a6b630f03f9f76a1b009d652884861ec6a49969ca68d30e1f109bdb55d029f6b82a3eb77d1935e483bb40f11b11
c1e9a3b5b6b2
```

Bob private key: bob.priv

```
0x8f6c63f70ed708f32ed796ecb4013dff2aaf6a0dc2b6d0ac51548684900f1bpriv
```

Bob public key: bob.pub

```
0x7fa870533fac1b47a6afe9cb9bb7f277f6580731332eda8842ff4001d11445853a3fe1a366d724b904296f69bc9e2b6889cb32e8ac4f814d046d
472627d41e71
```

Shared key: key1.key and key2.key

```
0x7f3ec1795e6fbc3a43c2a4b09c34087389168dcd93de8fb967658359a5a2aeb0x50bcc0fa7e801e2402810ce6abb8bfb8766102ca5a5cf4cd20
647d95d2db80b7
```

After Alice generates private key then public key named alice.priv then alice.pub by using command `keygen_ecdh.py -n al-`ice; and does the same operation for Bob to have bob.priv then bob.pub. The Table 6 resumes all key generated by the algorithm ECDH. By using `sharedkey_ecdh.py`, the Figure 29 shows that the shared key is equals for alice and bob part.

```

root@ubuntu:/home/cryptoandwifi/SRC# python3 shared_ecdh.py -p alice.pub -s bob
.priv -k key1.key
shared key
0x7f3ec1795e6fbc3a43c2a4b09c34087389168dcd93de8fb967658359a5a2aeeb0x50bcc0fa7e8
01e2402810ce6abb8bf8766102ca5a5cf4cd20647d95d2db80b7
root@ubuntu:/home/cryptoandwifi/SRC# python3 shared_ecdh.py -p bob.pub -s alice
.priv -k key2.key
shared key
0x7f3ec1795e6fbc3a43c2a4b09c34087389168dcd93de8fb967658359a5a2aeeb0x50bcc0fa7e8
01e2402810ce6abb8bf8766102ca5a5cf4cd20647d95d2db80b7
root@ubuntu:/home/cryptoandwifi/SRC#

```

Figure 29. Evaluating shared key using ECDH.

Table 7. CSIDH key exchange.

Alice private key: alice.priv

0x03fe02ef010a12000800fa0f02141303f3fff301efff17f9f80e02090406fd02ff0b09f9fbf70906080408fffe0606fa040702fcfcfafdfbf0301fd01010301fcfe04fe0004020400fd

Alice public key: alice.pub

0x50f89ef9a81a2d3bdf849b74d82cb1eb6287a8cba63c8dd77b8011f2777f97a1adee779bf5263ac0992a24a9152e5d4c2c63706a8ef6689ef83c3b2ea786413

Bob private key: bob.priv

0xff0600f9f100fc02fe08f6010a080b0bf50dff030df911f9f406f80df4f6fffe03f7ff01fdfd09060604fe01fa0600000607fe06fa0203fb03030501fd01fdfd02fefcfc04fe04fc0401

Bob public key: bob.pub

0xa7189f8303d91997ec4d313c07e6826512c2c570475c74616fd27d1cde0a4e6b2dfdfa787231941500d7f59b4c056da0d6a0f898487efa5315fb02ff7d9e844d

Shared key: key1.key and key2.key

0x0e230be22d7c1bee26f984ad50ef6602af2760dc69ec9912a2b0635dc7f20a6168e3d8301a75b0ff2f97c9b8203e8f561cbe014eadd45cab45dfc3cbd6ad6d44

```

root@ubuntu:/home/cryptoandwifi/SRC# python3 shared_csidh_sibc.py -p alice.pub
-s bob.priv -k key1.key
shared key
0e230be22d7c1bee26f984ad50ef6602af2760dc69ec9912a2b0635dc7f20a6168e3d8301a75b0f
f2f97c9b8203e8f561cbe014eadd45cab45dfc3cbd6ad6d44
root@ubuntu:/home/cryptoandwifi/SRC# python3 shared_csidh_sibc.py -p bob.pub -s
alice.priv -k key2.key
shared key
0e230be22d7c1bee26f984ad50ef6602af2760dc69ec9912a2b0635dc7f20a6168e3d8301a75b0f
f2f97c9b8203e8f561cbe014eadd45cab45dfc3cbd6ad6d44
root@ubuntu:/home/cryptoandwifi/SRC#

```

Figure 30. Evaluating shared key using CSIDH.

For the post-quantum part, API SIBC like on the reference is used [27]. After Alice generates private key then public key named alice.priv then alice.pub by using command key-gen_csidh_sibc.py -n alice; and does the same operation for Bob to have bob.priv then bob.pub. The Table 7 resumes all key generated by the algorithm CSIDH using API SIBC. By using sharedkey_csidh_sibc.py, the Figure 30 shows that shared key are equals for alice and bob part.

4. Conclusion

The WIFI is vulnerable by the classic attack which is cheap, simple, and selective denied of service and the future attack using SDR which is more disrupt, expensive and more complex. Indeed, these two attacks are more dangerous combined with portal captive. The feasibility of the attack of WPA3 and

the security of this problem are demonstrated. The cryptographic solution consists of using key exchange like DH, ECDH and CSIDH. This paper shows how to install and simulate the DH and ECDH algorithm. In the future, it's more secure to use CSIDH algorithm, which is quantum safe. This cryptographic solution protects to the classic attack by using secure deauthentication and the hopping frequency protects to the future attack based on jamming. As defenses, CSIDH cryptography should be implemented on real WIFI card in the future for improved direction by patching code at the driver.

Abbreviations

CSIDH: Commutative Super Isogenies Diffie Hellman
 DH: Diffie Hellman
 ECC: Elliptic Curve Cryptography
 ECDH: Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman
 IEEE: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
 KDF: Key Derivation Function
 MAC: Media Access Control
 MIMO: Multiple Input Multiple Output
 PIN: Personal Identification Number
 PMK: Pairwise Master Key
 PTK: Pairwise Transient key
 SDR: Software Defined Radio
 SSID: Service Set Identifier
 WAP: Wireless Application Protocol
 WEP: Wired Equivalent Privacy
 WiFi: Wireless Fidelity
 WPS: Wi-Fi Protected Setup

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

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