

# Global Security and the Role of the European Union

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**Abstract:** Present security situation in the world is differs from the Cold War and requires another approaches to solve many problems of regional or global character. To the fact, that the EU wants to play on the world political and military scene the role that is looking for, will be forced to work hard on enhancing effective (and in the future even a single) security policy, which has to be accompanied by an adequate building of military capabilities. Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is an integral part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), while it can be seen as a deepening of the CFSP, as well as a specific instrument of the CFSP. This article focuses on the role of the Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union, which through foreign operations and missions contributes to the stabilization and security not only in Europe but also globally. Attention is also paid to the expenses EU Member States spend on defense and last but not least to the analysis of issues in cooperation of the EU and NATO as an important factor of transatlantic security.

**Keywords:** Global Security, European Union, Common Foreign and Security Policy, Common Security and Defence Policy, EU Missions and Operations

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## 1. Introduction

The end of the bipolar division of the world in the nineties of the twenty century has significantly reduced the likelihood of a global war, but we can in no case accept that the current world situation is free of safety hazards. The current multipolarity brings new threats such as the escalation of a series of regional conflicts, which by their nature are beyond standard military strategies and procedures. Other major threats include: proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, failure states, organized crime, terrorism, international armed conflict, illegal immigration, etc [1].

In the context of global security situation, as pointed out by Kaňa, Mynarzová [2], the European Union together with other actors in global security, such as NATO and the U.S. have to assume its share of responsibility in this area. The importance of the European Union in the financial, economic and business field is unquestionable and it certainly ranks it among the world powers. With regard to this position in the world economy it undoubtedly brings a necessary duty to take adequate role on the international political scene. Foreign and security policy, which is considered one of the fundamental attributes of state sovereignty, is now - at the beginning of the 21st century- a forefront for a number of politicians who see it as a promising area for the deepening of the European integration process.

The current security situation in the world is different from the Cold War and, as such, requires different approaches to solve many problems of regional or global nature<sup>1</sup>. If the European Union wants to play the role it seeks on the world political and military scene, it will be forced to work intensively on the process of deepening effective and - in the future - perhaps even a single security policy, accompanied by building appropriate military capabilities. Strengthening effective adequate tools in the form of Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Common Security and Defence Policy to enable the European Union to cope with the above challenges, due to strengthening its own military, police and civilian capacity should ensure improvement in global security.

## 2. Gradual Building of Security Structures in the West European Integration Process

The Member States of the Community, which were developing integration on the economic level, gradually began

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<sup>1</sup> One of the key aspects of global security in the early 21st century are demographic factors, see Čajka, Kazanský [3].

to feel the need to defend their common economic and political interests also related to international relations.

The first specific steps towards security cooperation were already started by the Member States of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951. The division of Europe by the Iron Curtain, fears of the military forces of the Soviet Union (and reinforced by obtaining nuclear weapons) and starting conflict on the Korean peninsula – it all affirmed the political representation of France to take measures to strengthen own and also common defense (US plans of the rearmament of Germany also played a significant role). The role of France should be remembered, at that time as an initiator and an "engine" of shaping defense (military) dimension of the European Coal and Steel Community. These proposals (see below) were primarily to strengthen the role of Western Europe in organizing their own defense (independent of NATO) and strengthen the position of France itself as a leading country in this area [4].

The project, which was named after the French Prime Minister René Pleven, the French government announced in October 1950 envisaged the creation of a European army with a unified command and joint Ministry of Defense. Due to the aforementioned global security situation in the early 50s France attached high importance to this proposal and the project served as the basis for the concept of a European Defense Community (EDC), which was to unite Defense Policy ECSC. In February 1951 began negotiations on the establishment of a European army with the participation of France, Germany, Belgium, Italy and Luxembourg, countries such as the Netherlands, Norway, United Kingdom, USA and Canada have applied for observer status. The Treaty on EDC was signed by the foreign ministers of ECSC countries on May 27, 1952. France has pushed through several key requirements, such as concern for their involvement in Indochina, the gradual approximation of foreign policies of member countries, realization of integration in the military at the lowest possible level and precisely defined multinational control of the common army at the supranational level. However, the agreement was not ratified by the French National Assembly in 1954, for reasons of excessive fear of strengthening the role of Germany and its army in EDC and calming influence of global security situation (death of J.V. Stalin, the end of the Korean War).

The end of EDC also buried a project to establish the European political community that counted on the common organization based on ECSC and the European Defense Community [5, 6].

The only (purely European) organization, which focused on the development of mutual cooperation in the security (and not to say also military) area remained the Western European Union (WEU), one of the first (purely European) post-war activities in the field of defense policy, which during its more than fifty years of existence fulfilled this role and significantly contributed not only to preserve the form of Western European cooperation of ECSC countries, but also to later develop the very foreign and Security policy of the European Union (see Box 1).

### *Box 1 Western European Union*

Brussels Treaty, which laid the foundations of the so called Western Union, was signed on 17th March 1948 by the foreign ministers of five Western European countries (Great Britain, Belgium, France, Netherlands and Luxembourg). After a few years, the signing of the Paris Agreements on 23 October 1954 decided to further normalize relations between Western European countries; Treaty of Brussels was extended by the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy. Western Union was thus transformed into the Western European Union whose members eventually became ten EU Member States (Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and United Kingdom). During the Cold War WEU didn't play a very important role (due to the involvement of its members in NATO), but its role in the defense of Western Europe the European Communities has been strengthened by the Rome Declaration (1984) and later the Hague platform (1987, the so called Platform of European security interests). In 1992 so-called Petersburg agreements were ratified that define new tasks of Western European Union. These agreements allow the WEU member states military forces to participate in humanitarian and rescue missions, peacekeeping operations (peacekeeping) and missions of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. The Treaty on European Union (1993 - Maastricht Treaty) established an institutional structure based on three pillars, while the second pillar was designed for the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU and its active promotion. Under this agreement was also clearly defined the relationship between the EU and WEU, when this becomes an integral part of the EU, while it is thought of as defensive pillar of NATO in Europe.

In 1994, the concept of a European Security and Defense Identity, ESDI was approved at the Brussels summit of the EU Council. The project even provided for the establishment of European units (Combined Joint Task Force, CJTF). ESDI concept was created based on WEU within NATO, which led to the introduction of practical measures that would enable the Alliance possible support of European military operations under the mandate of WEU. In this way, the Western European Union was simultaneously developed as the defense component of the EU as "European pillar of NATO." However, already next document of primary law - the Amsterdam Treaty, which entered into force in 1999, moved aforementioned Petersburg tasks to the provisions relating to the second pillar of the EU (Title V of the TEU), which created the conditions for the integration of the WEU into the EU. The Community could thus increasingly take advantage of all WEU capacity for planning and implementing all their events and gradually take over all previous WEU tasks.

Due to the validity of the Paris Agreements (55 years), the activities of the Western European Union ended on March 31, 2010, but already in connection with the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, it was decided that during the year 2011, the European Union will take over all activities of WEU. It should be emphasized that the transition of the Western European Union under the direct control of the EU, which was allowed

in the early 90s by the Maastricht Treaty, has become one of the basic assumptions of the creation of an independent European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy.

Source: [6].

In the early 60s were on the initiative of French President de Gaulle developed further proposals for political status of European Nations Union, whose author was a French politician Christian Fouchet, whose two proposals developed in 1961-1962 are known as Fouchet plan. One of the goals was also foreign policy cooperation, but this project has met with inconsistent attitude of the other EU member countries, mainly due to weakening elements of supranational integration. Negotiations failed in three areas: uncertainty about the position of the UK, differences of opinion on the question of European defense, which was to become independent of NATO and too strong inter-governmental nature of the institutions proposed, which would likely undermine the supranational aspect of the existing Community institutions.

In 1969 at Summit of the six member nations of the European Communities in The Hague an agreement was reached on strengthening cooperation in the political sphere. Mandates were entrusted to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Member States under the leadership of Etienne Davignon (political director of the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and later Vice-President of the European Commission), so they would suggest the possibility of further political unification - as it was heading towards extension of the Community.

The mission team presented the first so-called Davignon report at the Luxembourg summit of the European Communities in 1970. It was recommended to create a system that would lead to mutual understanding in international affairs and to better enforcement of the will of individual member countries through better information and regular consultations. This should be achieved at meetings of foreign ministers, whose task was to also maintain a durable connection between the ambassadors of the Member States, in the capitals of third countries. Luxembourg summit adopted these recommendations of so-called Davignon report, which has launched a European political cooperation (EPS) in the area of foreign policy. The first meeting of Foreign Ministers in accordance with the recommended regimen was held in Munich in November 1970 and the first foreign policy statement by the Member States of the EC was issued in May 1971 on issues of the Middle East. The commenced process was evaluated as successful and the second Davignon report, released at the Copenhagen summit in 1973, recommended its continuation. It focused primarily on the meeting of foreign ministers, when the current number of meetings had to double, ie four meetings per year [6, 7].

Although the EPS has always been an intergovernmental activity it began to slowly change its nature, since Member States have gradually ceased to be concerned about its possible super nationalization. Formal creation of the European Council in 1974 contributed to a significant increase in EPS within the Community. The European Council at their

summits regularly discussed foreign policy issues and could thus determine the orientation of a broader foreign policy of EC Member States towards improved efficiency and the coordination.

Another important step was the adoption of so-called London report (European Council meeting in London in 1981), its most important benefits included the introduction of a specific mechanism for rapid response in the event of a crisis. It was thus possible to convene a meeting at ministerial level of EPS within 48 hours. At the same time the London report mentioned the possibility of moving from the principle of mutual consultations towards the adoption of joint action.

A further shift in the coordination of the foreign policies of member countries was committed under the Single European Act - SEA. The contract was signed in February 1986 in Luxembourg and The Hague, and it was the first document of primary law, which revised the founding integration contracts of the European Communities. An important innovation brought by SEA, the direct adjustment of foreign policy cooperation between the Member States of the Community. SEA contained a separate Title III (Provisions on European cooperation in the field of foreign policy).

Based on the SEA was established EPS secretariat based in Brussels, which should assist the presiding state in the preparation and implementation of European Political Cooperation and in administrative matters. EPS structure was formalized composed of the European Council, the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Political Committee, working committees and so-called European Group correspondents. Looking ahead, the relevant part of JEA later became the nucleus of the second pillar of the European Union [8].

In terms of foreign and security policy major changes were brought during the process of its deepening the early '90s, when there was a pan-European and global perspective to the most important events from the beginning of the process of European integration after World War II. It was therefore evident that the Community responded to these fundamental geopolitical changes and the result was the Treaty of Maastricht. On the one hand, the fall of communism in Central and Eastern Europe and the reunification of Germany led to the commitment (and need) to strengthen the international position of the Community, on the other hand there was the will of member states to continue the reform process within the objectives set by the Single European Act [9].

These events led to the organization of two intergovernmental conferences - the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and political union. At the European Council of 27 and 28 June 1988 in Hannover, under the presidency of Mr Delors, a group of experts had to work on the principles of EMU, while during the Summit of April 28, 1990 in Dublin, the European Council decided for the process to change the existing contracts so that it can continue the European integration also in the political sphere.

Everything has been discussed and debated at the summit in Maastricht (9 and 10 December 1991). Clear contours of the concept of Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union - CFSP have been raised there. CFSP was

subsequently established by the Treaty on European Union (EU), signed in Maastricht, which entered into force on 1 November 1993. This contract established the already mentioned three pillar structure, where the CFSP was the second pillar. Although the basic principles have been expressed, its establishment represented only the first crucial step in the further development of integration. The second pillar was built strictly at intergovernmental level (as well as the third pillar). The European Commission and the European Parliament could not take decisions in this area. As the main instrument of implementation of a common policy were established joint actions and common positions adopted in most cases by a unanimous decision of the Member States and only in collaboration with the European Commission and the European Parliament [10]. The basic patterns of work within the CFSP were means of systematic cooperation (consultations, mutual awareness and cooperation of the member countries diplomatic and consular missions, including missions to international organization and representatives of the Commission). The European Council was assigned as a Coordinator for the CFSP (taking strategic principles and guidelines) together with the presiding country. The presiding country represented the EU, was responsible for the management of joint actions and the representation of common positions in international fora. The contract states that the presiding state carries out its tasks with the assistance of other members of the Troika and the Commission. The main actor in the framework of CFSP was the Council. The foreign ministers were asked to take the necessary decisions to pursue a policy of CFSP and ensure its maximum effectiveness. The EU Council was also an authority, where common approaches and actions were adopted, for its approval it was necessary to reach unanimity. Council was assisted by Political Committee, whose functioning had to be more in line with the role of COREPER [11, 12].

The Maastricht Treaty created the space for more active promotion of the common foreign and security policy of the EU on the international scene. It turned out, however, that the adopted provisions have been considerable progress compared to the previous state, but did not allow the Union to act on the international scene enough operatively and flexibly. Enshrine the principle of unanimity did not allow the Union to react even in cases where the majority of Member States had clearly defined attitude that other Member States were willing to tolerate. Also adopted instruments have proved to be limited, because did not allow the Union to declare its long-term interests and promote them with the resources available to it. The EU also missed Permanent Representative, which would in international negotiations led political dialogue with partners and interpreted the opinions and attitudes of the Union.

Problematic areas within the CFSP should have solved the Amsterdam Treaty. It introduced a common strategy as a new tool so-called Constructive abstention as a new element to improve decision-making processes. It stimulated the decision making process when adopting joint actions, attitudes and other decisions based on common strategies and the

implementation of joint actions and common position already adopted - a qualified majority was enough for approval. Also, for these cases there was introduced the so-called Insurance clause that allowed Member States to block a majority vote of its own compelling reasons of national policy. The Amsterdam Treaty created a new position of High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (also merged with the post of Secretary General of the Council in order to give greater importance to this policy and make it clearer and more transparent). An important change in the concept and nature of the EU CFSP was the inclusion of the above-mentioned Petersberg tasks Western European Union in Title V of the EU Treaty (second pillar). The Treaty of Amsterdam has further established that CFSP operations will be financed from the EU budget. An exception should be the operations which had a defense or military nature and cost of the individual Member States were divided by the gross national product, unless the Council unanimously decided otherwise [11, 13].

The subsequent development of the security situation in the world and the emergence of European Security and Defence Policy showed that the action taken by the Treaty of Amsterdam will require some adjustments. Intergovernmental Conference convened to 7 - 9 December 2000 in Nice and among other things measures to achieve greater flexibility of CFSP were discussed there. The Nice Treaty was signed by the Foreign Ministers of the Member States of 26 February 2001 and entered into force on 1 February 2003. In the second pillar all references of WEU were removed, differentiated voting on the joint action or a common position (QMV). Political Committee was renamed to the Political and Security Committee. What was new was an option called Enhanced cooperation between Member States in the framework of joint action or a common position (cannot be used in matters having military or defense implications).

A new dimension in the implementation of CFSP was brought by Lisbon Treaty, signed 13 December 2007, in force since 1 December 2009. This contract canceled the pillar structure of the EU. The original second pillar, however, continues to maintain its specific properties. CFSP was incorporated into the EU Treaty - i.e. outside the framework of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, which regulates all other common policies of the European Union. This meant that CFSP retained its intergovernmental character. The key changes related to decision-making within CFSP did not occur, the main principle remained the unanimity of the European Council and the EU. One of the most important institutional changes represents the establishment of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (merged two existing features - High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and External Relations Commissioner) who also leads the Foreign Affairs Council and will also be the Vice-President (responsible for external relations). The newly established institutions - the European External Action Service should help the High Representative with his role. Another change that the Lisbon Treaty brings, is contractual confirmation of European Defense Agency, EDA into primary legislation, which thus becomes the coordination,

monitoring and administrative center of the joint forces of the 26 Member States - with the exception of Denmark [14, 15].

### 3. Common Foreign and Security Policy and Common Security and Defence Policy of European Union as a Keystone of EU External Relations

European Common Foreign and Security Policy is very specific and peculiar area due to the national sovereignty of Member States, which remain under national control. According to Article 24 Treaty on European Union (TEU) is to ensure that Member States shall refrain from any action which would be contrary to the interests of the European Union or would reduce its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations [16].

The development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union and its emergence in 1993 was accompanied by a number of activities in the diplomatic field and thus the emphasis on the "foreign" dimension [17]. Despite the gradual strengthening of the role of the Union in the field of international relations and in diplomatic activities in resolving many conflicts, its military capabilities were not able to provide, maintain and successfully solve any operation outside the territories of the Member States<sup>2</sup>. This fact led first to the creation of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), as an integral part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and then changed its name to the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) – by Lisbon Treaty [18, 19]. Embedding the term the Common Security and Defence Policy in the Lisbon Treaty (TEU, Title V) provides a framework for a common defense policy, which might in the future developed into a common EU defense<sup>3</sup>.

The Maastricht Treaty is a landmark document in the history of the Community, which created the system of pillars within the structure of the European Union through which helped to shape relatively clearly defined area based on the principle of supranational and intergovernmental. It should however be emphasized that the pillar structure was part of a compromise because of the traditionally divergent positions of Member States on the issue of community affairs<sup>4</sup>. The second pillar, consisting of Common Foreign and Security Policy, has become a platform for further deepening cooperation between Member States as well as in the field of security and defense [5]. Treaty of Lisbon decided to transfer the powers and functions of the WEU to the EU institutions in 2011 [20].

The original intentions of the Community in the early 90's brought hopes to the military potential of the Western European Union that wanted to build a defense policy while strengthening the European pillar of NATO; however, these actions did not lead to the desired success (see Box 1).

There are many reasons, e.g. different opinions of members of the WEU and the European Union, traditionally different positions of France and Great Britain to the U.S. role in European security, the inability of WEU to agree on a form of interference during the events in the former Yugoslavia, Albania or in the case of the massacre in Rwanda. Call for establishment of a common European defense finally emerged from a meeting of British Prime Minister Tony Blair and French President J. Chirac in Saint-Malo, in December 1998. This was a groundbreaking event, especially when Britain reconsidered its negative opinion on the defense role of the CFSP and thus allowed strengthening of the military capabilities of the EU [21].

The concept of a European Security and Defence Policy was first officially used at an EU summit in Cologne (June 1999), where an agreement on the mechanisms of coordination in crisis situations was made and a plan to create a European military capacity was started. The summit appointed the first High Representative for the CFSP - J. Solana, who should be assisted by the newly formed committees, and the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and the EU Military Committee (EUMC). Another crucial summit for the development of ESDP was meeting in Helsinki in December 1999. Within the framework of the European Headline Goal - EHG requirements for military units were concretized<sup>5</sup>, that should be able to realize the types of missions (including in the establishment of peace), which were approved under the Petersberg tasks<sup>6</sup>. The result of the Helsinki meeting was also WEU transfer of powers in relation to crisis management to the European Union and decisions on the establishment of political-military EU institutions within EU structures that provide strategic leadership for EU-led operations. Work group of EU and NATO was created in July 2000 to ensure the effectiveness of the European Headline Goal and like the NATO - the Initiative Defense Capabilities.

At the Nice Summit (December 2000), the concept of the military structure of ESDP and CFSP was definitively established, the Political and Security Committee, the EU Military Committee and Military Staff of the European have begun to operate since 2001. The Treaty of Nice (2003), which

<sup>2</sup> A typical example is the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, including Kosovo War (1998-1999).

<sup>3</sup> In this regard, it would have to be decided unanimously by the European Council. Given the current level of cooperation (and opinions) of EU Member States in this area, however, early realization of this idea cannot be expected.

<sup>4</sup> Eg. Netherlands, Belgium and Greece favored a Community approach on foreign and security policy, while Great Britain, along with France, Denmark and Portugal were against it. By mutual agreement, the first pillar remained open to possible shifts of agreed areas from the second and third pillars.

<sup>5</sup> Member States had pledged that by 2003, would create a rapid reaction force of up to 60,000 people, the so-called European Rapid Reaction Forces, the ERDF, the goal was declared achievable in 2003, but lacked transport capacity for the transport of military forces over long distances, the necessary communication systems and some types of latest sophisticated equipment. Subsequently battle groups were formed.

<sup>6</sup> One of the most important steps, achieved in early 90s, is the inclusion of the so-called Petersberg tasks in security policy, which today forms an important part of the common security and defense policy. Petersberg agreement allowed military forces of the WEU (member countries) to participate in humanitarian and rescue missions, peacekeeping missions and combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.

incorporated the ESDP into primary law, then finally confirmed the concept of political-military structures and defined the institution responsible for the functioning of the ESDP [22].

One of the Union key strategic documents on security was adopted December 12, 2003 as the European Security Strategy (subtitled *A Secure Europe in a Better World*) in order to identify the threats and the EU's position in the security environment. The European Security Strategy proposed the ways to face these threats together. In addition to the soft tools such as diplomacy and economic relations of the Union, it also mentions the use of military force. This strategy was revised in 2008 so as to respond to new security challenges. The newly defined threats included energy security, threats related to climate change and cybersecurity [23, 5]. In May 2004, the Headline Goal 2010, has been approved which included the concept of EU Battlegroups (EU Battle Groups Concept). These comprehensive security military units of about 1,500 men (in one or several EU member states) have to give the EU the ability to quickly intervene mainly in lower intensity conflicts (for example, in the context of evacuation and humanitarian missions or operations to prevent conflict). These groups are able to operate anywhere in the world within a radius of 6000 km from Brussels and must be able to deploy within 10 days of the decision of the EU Council. They must be able to stay in the place of conflict for 30 days, after the completion of units the period can be extended to up to 120 days or until the arrival of other units. There are always two battle groups on call alert and the ability to conduct two operations simultaneously is required. The first units reached operational capability January 1, 2007 [24]. Treaty of Lisbon (2009) replaced the current term European Security and Defense Policy by the new term Common Security and Defense Policy, the latter continue to be a part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union. It also introduced the so-called starter fund for the EU military operation, which complements the existing mechanism for financing of EU military operations - ATHENA. Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD) was established in November 2009 in connection with the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty as part of the EU Directorate. This led to the integration of civilian and military dimensions of strategic planning and crisis management, which enhances the comparative advantage of the EU - the possibility of using a wide range of instruments for mission leadership. The permanent structured cooperation in defense, in which the participating States (the minimum number is not listed) undertake a more intensive development of its defense capabilities and provide its armed forces for the planned operation have become a new tool. Permanent structured cooperation shall be subject to approval by the EU Council, which decides by qualified majority at the request of the participating countries [25, 26].

Foreign missions and operations of the European Union can be a real contribution to improving global security. Foreign operations and missions of the European Union carried out under the CSDP are considered the most important tool to

ensure not only its own but also global security. This makes it the top of the existing efforts of the Union's CSDP. Not all Member States are involved equally in the foreign operations, but it always regards the participation of the countries under the auspices of the Union. The European Union recognizes three types of these operations - military, police and missions in support of the rule of law. These types differ not only based on personnel involved (troops, police officers, civil servants), but in particular by its features (TEU, Article 43).

Since 2003, when the first EU foreign mission (EUPM) was sent - by February 2014 a total of 33 missions were sent, 16 of which have already been completed. Five of them were purely military, 10 were civilian/police and one operation (AMIS II) had a civilian-military character. As of December 2014, the Union conducted a total of 17 missions (see Table 1), 5 of which can be referred as military and 12 civilian/police. The key missions can include those in Somalia (Horn of Africa) and Kosovo.

The mission EU NAVFOR Somalia (Atalanta) was a major present military (Navy) EU operation [27], running at the same time with two instructional (security) missions. On 2 June 2008 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1816, which called on states to combat piracy and armed robbery at sea. Council of the EU on 10 November 2008 decided to launch the operation EU NAVFOR ATALANTA. The operation was launched on 8 December 2008 and its mandate is focused on providing protection to vessels prior to pirate attacks, the prosecution of piracy and mugging ships along the Somali coast. The operation was extended until 2014 in March 2012 and its territorial jurisdiction was extended. Atalanta is just one part of a comprehensive approach to the issue of piracy and security in the Horn of Africa.

Training/Security EUCAP Nestor mission (building maritime capacity) and the EU Training Mission Somalia (Somali security forces) are two operations that help solve the problems of the region and are complementary to EU NAVFOR. Atalanta's mission includes the participation of non-EU countries (Montenegro, Serbia, Ukraine, Norway) together with the 24 member countries.

Military vessels are provided by Spain, Germany, the Netherlands and France. Common costs within the ATHENA mechanism are estimated at 39.65 million EUR. Operating and personnel costs are paid from the national budgets of the participating countries. Atalanta mission has contributed significantly to the reduction of pirate attacks in the region [28, 27].

EULEX Kosovo represents the largest civilian CSDP mission. After the unilateral declaration of independence (2008) local authorities were not able to provide standard functioning of public institutions and security structures. The very beginning of the mission EULEX Kosovo (originally December 2008) was indeed problematic due to Serbian and later Kosovar objections and concerns. There has been a shift until April 2009. Mission is divided into two divisions: Executive Division and Strengthening Division. Executive Division focuses on cases of war crimes, manifestations of terrorism, organized crime, corruption, etc. Strengthening

Division is to support the government and public institutions, judicial authorities and law enforcement institutions. EU experts provide advice, training, do the actual management of the authorities so as to develop and strengthen an independent judiciary, the police and customs administration.

The mission involved 27 member countries of the EU (with Croatia, without Cyprus) and 5 non-member States which sent about 1200 experts. According to official sources, the mission assessed as successful (especially in the judiciary, customs and police), but many observers talk about the high rate of crime, corruption and slow process due to the very high budget [29, 30].

*Table 1. Ongoing EU Missions and Operations.*

Missions	Destination	Starting year	Estimated costs
EUBAM Libya	Libya	2013	30.3 mil. EUR
EUTM Mali	Mali	2013	12.3 mil. EUR
EUCAP SAHEL Niger	Niger	2012	8.7 mil. EUR*
EUCAP SAHEL Mali	Mali	2015	11,4 mil EUR/2015
EUCAP NESTOR	Kenya, Djibouti, Somalia, Seychelles	2012	22.88 mil. EUR*
EUTM Somalia	Somalia	2010	11.6 mil. EUR
EU NAVFOR Somalia	Somalia	2008	39.65 mil. EUR**
EUFOR RCA	Central African Republic	2014	25.9 mil. EUR
EUSEC RD Congo	DR Congo	2005	73.5 mil. EUR
EUPOL RD Congo	DR Congo	2007	39.92 mil. EUR
ALTHEA/BiH	Bosnia and Herzegovina	2004	15 mil. EUR
EULEX Kosovo	Kosovo	2008	111 mil. EUR/year
EUPOL Afghanistan	Afghanistan	2007	108 mil. EUR/2013-2014
EUMM Georgia	Georgia	2008	20.9 mil. EUR
EUBAM Rafah	Palestinian Territories	2005	0.98 mil. EUR till 30. 6. 2013
EUPOL COPPS/PT	Palestinian Territories	2006	9.33 mil. EUR/2012-2013
EUBAM Moldova and Ukraine	Moldova and Ukraine	2005	21 mil. EUR/2011-2013

\* estimation for the first year, \*\* estimation till the end of 2014

Source: [30], own processing

#### 4. EU and NATO Cooperation in the Field of Global Security

The guarantor of European security and a major player in the global security arena is the North Atlantic Alliance. Both organizations since its establishment contribute to ensuring and strengthening the security situation in Europe, although the method of ensuring the safety of each organization differed. NATO was founded as a typical military international organization disposing armies of its member states to implement the relevant operations. It has set itself the objective of ensuring political stability, particularly in the integration process. The development of mutual relations does

not start until the end of the Cold War, when the EU begins to intensively develop its activities in the field of foreign and security policy. Sphere of interest of the European Union and NATO as well as most of their members overlapped. It is therefore understandable that their relationship and cooperation were key elements of a Common Security and Defense Policy.

22 countries are part of both organizations, that is three-quarters of the 28 members of the EU and therefore the question of mutual cooperation is fundamental and still relevant. Washington NATO meeting in 1999, changed the former Berlin framework (the concept of international task force in 1996, which ensured mechanisms of use of NATO military capabilities for WEU). According to the conclusion of the NATO Council in Berlin, the Alliance decided to make its capacity available and that the WEU will create consultation mechanisms and closer ties between the two organizations. In this context there is talk of the Berlin mechanism. A set of agreements between NATO and the EU itself was called Berlin Plus. Planning mainly military operations has long been the biggest point of contention among EU Member States and the EU and NATO. In particular, Great Britain has long rejected the establishment of autonomous EU planning centers, which, in its opinion, weaken the role of the Alliance. Member States finally agreed on a compromise solution. Planning EU military operations can use either the structure of NATO in the framework of the Berlin Plus agreements or national planning center authorized by Member States. EU used the first option for example when planning Operation Concordia in Macedonia or Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the French infrastructure (France as the framework nation) was used in the planning of the operation Artemis in Congo. Essentially, the current mutual relations are governed by EU-NATO Declaration on European Security and Defence Policy, approved December 16, 2002, which at that time meant the recognition and support of the European Security and Defence Policy of the Alliance. On March 17, 2003 the above Berlin Plus agreements were signed to ensure cooperation between the two organizations. It has formed the basis of the present cooperation between the two organizations. EU signatory was high representative for the CFSP, Javier Solana, NATO signatory was NATO Secretary General George Robertson [31]. The very precise and comprehensive texts of Berlin plus agreements, how this key set of agreements is commonly referred to, is not publicly known, due to the confidential nature of certain documents.

Information from the official NATO Press Release is generally used, the most comprehensive version of the agreement is presented to the Alliance through information on the website SHAPE - Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe. Communiqué of the Washington Summit (1999), where this document was created<sup>7</sup>, provides most information on the four points of the contract (directly related to the possibilities of the EU). Use of the Berlin plus mechanism is

<sup>7</sup> A relatively long delay between the document creation and the official signing was caused long-term Turkish refusal.


possible within the NATO first refusal meaning the right of NATO to be the first to refuse the realization of the mission. Only then the EU decides for or against the mission using the offered capacity. If the Council decides to launch an operation within the Berlin plus, it is granted access to the operational capacities of the Alliance.

Mutual cooperation and coordination between NATO and the EU is currently based on a number of formal and informal mechanisms. Based on the Berlin Plus agreement NATO-EU Capability Group was created, which should ensure the coherence of NATO and the EU with regard to the development of interaction skills. Representatives of both organizations will have to meet several times a year. Contact is also provided by the staffs of both organizations - NATO International Military Staff and the EU Military Staff. Within the EU Military Staff a NATO liaison team is permanently present and a representative of the EU (EU Cell) operates at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe. There are also regular meetings of EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Secretary General of NATO, while individual Foreign Affairs ministers meet during informal meetings [31].

As mentioned above, the fact that 22 Member States of the European Union are also Member States of NATO, is a sufficient argument for future effective cooperation in the field of international security. If individual EU countries want to ensure their own safety and also be eligible NATO ally, they must necessarily increase defense spending. The imbalance between spending on defense and military capabilities between the United States and other NATO members is striking.

At the end of the Cold War, European countries cut, sometimes very radically, their defence expenditures. Faced with peace on the continent, EU governments thought that they could finally benefit from "peac dividends" and could reallocate these resources to other areas of public spending. Thus, whilst on average western European countries spent 3.1% of their GDP on defence between 1985 and 1989, this figure had fallen to 1.7% in 2008, and this was before the budgetary crisis [32].

Since 2008 there is a continuous decline in defence spending of EU member states. As "Fig 1" shows, in 2008, defence spending amounted to 201 billion EUR (in 26 Member States of the European Defence Agency - EDA), representing a year compared to a decrease of 1.3%. So far, the largest decline in spending was recorded in 2009, to the extent of 3.6%. In 2012, total defence spending 190 billion EUR, which represented an annual decrease of 0.6%. In this year the expenditures were the lowest since 2006, amounted to only 1.5% of GDP and 3.04% of total public expenditure. As regards the structure of defence spending in the EU Member States, the personnel expenditures in 2011-2012 decreased by almost 3%, and again reached the lowest level since 2006 (95.7 billion EUR). However, these costs represent approximately 50% of the total defence spending. The second largest item of expenditure on maintenance and operation, which in 2012 amounted to 44.8 billion EUR, represented 23.7% of total defence spending.



Source: [33], own processing.

**Figure 1.** GDP, Overall Government Expenditure and Total Defence Expenditure in EU-26 2006-2012.

Regarding investment in defence spending, then after a sharp annual decline in 2011 of 13.8%, an increase of 5% was recorded in 2012, to reach the same level as in 2006. Defence investment amount 39 billion EUR in 2006 and their share of total defence spending reached 20.6%. Expenditure on research and development as a significant part of defence investment recorded in this period the steepest decline (38%) and reached in 2012 4.8 billion EUR, i.e. only 2.5% of total expenditure on defense [33].

In 2012, only two EU Member States exceeded the required level of defense expenditure amounting to at least 2% of GDP [34]. What is dangerous is the fact that it represents rather a long-term trend than a consequence of the financial crisis. This low level of defense spending currently does not allow Member States to optimize their use and to increase their military capacity. The continuation of this trend may in the medium term, mean gradual loss of influence of the European Union in the field of security and defense [2].

## 5. Conclusion

Before the issue of current conflict resolution, whether through military intervention or through diplomatic negotiations, confronts the European Union with the need to strengthen its position in the field of foreign and security policy and to build the necessary military capabilities that will ensure the required status. Building and strengthening adequate tools in the form of a Common Foreign and Security Policy and its framework of the Common Security and Defence Policy will allow the European Union to cope with the above challenges, due to strengthening its own military, police and civilian capabilities to ensure improvements of global security in the future.

In particular, completed missions and operations of the EU, as one of the key instruments in the framework of the Common Security and Defence Policy, are according to the official communiqué of the EU Council, but also other EU institutions, considered successful. Of course, opinions of independent experts may be more critical but time shows the real success rate of current operations [35].

It can be stated that the possibilities for the EU military operation and possible deployment of battle groups are quite

wide. Despite the gradual strengthening of the role of the Union in the field of international relations and in diplomatic activities in resolving many conflicts, its military capabilities are not yet able to provide, maintain and successfully solve large-scale operations outside the territory of the Member States. The limited capacity of expedition forces is due mainly to the lack of defense expenditures in EU countries.

In addition to these foreign CSDP missions they played an important role in the case of major events, known as the so-called Arab Spring that took place during the year 2011. What was clearly reflected here was an inconsistent attitude of the EU countries, especially in the case of civil war in Syria (the question of common opinion on the arms embargo). Even today, there is little consensus on EU sanctions against Russia in the aftermath of the events in Ukraine. Catherine Ashton, former EU Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy was often criticized for a little and relatively passive activity. We believe that to ensure global security, a functional cooperation between the EU and NATO is necessary. The European Union is currently the most important partner of NATO and this fact cannot be changed even by some members of the U.S. administration who think that building own military capabilities within the CSDP is useless and inefficient. The future development of NATO will surely play a key role in the development of a common security and defense policy of the Union, meaning that European countries would take responsibility for their own safety. The best solution for the EU's cooperation with NATO in the field of global security seems to be an approach of enhanced coordination, which would accept the necessary degree of specialization and shift the maximum possible level of mutual compatibility while strengthening the above mentioned formal mechanism of cooperation.

Compatibility and necessary harmonization should be strengthened at the level of administration, public policy, and also in the field of building, training and equipping military units so they can subsequently be used by both organizations. This cooperation could be seen as very important for both EU and its CSDP in relation to the conduct of military missions or potential future development of the CSDP.

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